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Preface 
 
2004 marks the centenary of the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan, a 
significant event in the history of both countries. A symposium was held in the Michio 
Morishima Room at STICERD on 16 March 2004 and attracted a large specialist 
audience. 
 
Since many conference are being held around the world to reassess this event, we 
chose to entitle our symposium 'On the Periphery of the Russo-Japanese War'. That is, 
we concentrated on countries like China and Britain whose interests were closely tied up 
with the war, though they were not themselves belligerents. 
 
The following papers were presented: 
 
Ian Nish (London School of Economics and Political Science): China and the Russo-
Japanese War 
 
John Chapman (formerly of the University of Sussex): Britain's Naval Estimation of 
Japan and Russia, 1894-1905 
 
David Steeds (formerly of the University of Wales, Aberystwyth): Japan at War: The 
Diary of a British Observer, 1904 
 
Sebastian Dobson (Librarian, the Japan Society, London): Lt.-General Sir Ian Hamilton 
and his Scrapbook 
 
 
The first two appear in this pamphlet; the last two will appear shortly in Part II. The 
Centre is grateful to the authors for allowing us to reproduce their papers. 
 
The symposium was held in association with the Japan Society, London. 
 
The Centre issued an earlier pamphlet on this theme of the Russo-Japanese War with 
papers by Stewart Lone and Philip Towle (STICERD International Studies, IS/98/351). 
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Abstracts 
 
 
 
Chapman: Major defects in British naval intelligence were the absence of an effective 
central department, an inferior network of naval attachés in major capitals prior to 1902 
and the lack of secure direct cable communications with Northeast Asia. The 
performance of the Naval Intelligence Department was changed for the better by the 
efforts of Lord Selborne as First Lord of the Admiralty (1900-5). Selborne's promotion of 
Britain's alliance with Japan was conditional on a close working relationship with the 
administration of Theodore Roosevelt. 
 
Nish: There was considerable uncertainty and indecision about whether China would 
take part in the Russo-Japanese war. Finally under considerable outside pressure she 
declared strict neutrality. Since the civil administration in her Three Eastern Provinces 
(Manchuria) was in Chinese hands, she inevitably had a role in the war; and her people 
suffered much. 
 
The Portsmouth treaties that ended the war could only be implemented with China's 
agreement. Foreign Minister Komura had to conclude new treaties with China at the 
Peking Conference on 22 December 1905. 
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 1 
CHINA AND THE RUSSO JAPANESE WAR 
Ian Nish 
 
The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 was fought initially in Korea and later on Chinese 
soil in Manchuria. China was in a sense the main victim of the war. Manchuria, the so-
called Three Eastern Provinces, was the heartland of the Ching dynasty and intensive 
Chinese colonization had taken place there from 1902 onwards.1 But Russian armies 
had been in occupation of key points in the territory since 1900 and controlled its 
railway. Japan was in 1903 poised to challenge Russia's preeminent position. As war 
approached, two issues arose: what attitude the Chinese would take to the possibility of 
Japanese sending armies to Manchuria; and what military part China herself wanted to 
play in any war? These and the role she took in any peace settlement in east Asia  are 
the points I shall try to address in this paper. 
 
China at the Brink of War 
A major observer of the Chinese scene, Sir Robert Hart, the Director-general of the 
Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service, wrote in his letter of 20 December 1903: 
 
'I don't know what China will do: some advise going with Japan -others with 
Russia - and others standing still.'2 
 
He thought that there was still some doubt about China's attitude as late as the New 
Year. Hart was aware that there was not much that China could offer to either side. 
Certainly not financially: she could not give loans. Nor militarily: the Chinese army was 
large but was still being modernized through Japanese advisers. 
 
Hart's observations were to some extent supported by Uchida Yasuya, the Japanese 
minister in Beijing (1901-6). His writings are one of the best sources on Japan's 
reactions to Chinese indecision in this crisis. One of his prime concerns was whether 
there was a secret treaty of alliance against Japan which was rumoured to exist 
between China and Russia. This alliance was thought to have been concluded in 1896 
by A.I. Pavlov, the Russian chargé d'affaires, and Dmitri D. Pokotilov to last for 15 
years, allegedly by extensive use of bribery. Worried by persistent rumours that it was 
still in force, Uchida was afraid that the Chinese leaders were in Russia's pocket in this 
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emergency and thought that Russia was urging China to fulfil her obligation to help in 
the war. Uchida spent much effort uncovering evidence that it existed and speculating 
what practical effect it would have if war came.3 
 
Although Li Hung-chang, the Chinese statesman closest to Russia, had died in 1901, 
his successors seemed to have joined in many negotiations giving the Russians 
improved access to the south of Manchuria and only stood up to the Russians under 
Great Power pressure. The Chinese felt that they were not strong enough to resist 
Russian demands unless they had the clear support of other powers. Russia had 
entered into a treaty in 1902 undertaking to withdraw her troops in three tranches but 
the Chinese had been let down by the Russians when their armies did not pull out as 
promised in the second tranche. Instead they covered up their default by imposing fresh 
conditions. Their representatives in Peking, G.A. Planson who was chargé d'affaires 
(November 1902-May 1903) and Paul Mikhaelovich Lessar, when he returned from sick 
leave in Russia, were under instructions to insist on new conditions being met prior to 
the evacuation of their troops. Agreeable men and competent officials, they had the 
effect by their stance of freezing the situation in Manchuria and exciting Japan's 
suspicions even more. 4 
 
But Hart's intelligence suggested that things were moving in Japan's direction at the 
Chinese court.   
 
'Russian doings at Moukden and the views of some leading officials appear to 
have decided the Court to throw in its lot with Japan in the Manchurian question. 
Yuan Shih Kai and Chang Chih Tung had special audiences on 2nd and 3rd 
[November], and I think that settled the matter: on 4th Wang Wen-shao 
(Russian) was put out of the [Tsungli] Yamen and Na Tung (Japanese) put into 
it: this is thought significant and amounts to a pro-Japanese demonstration. Thus 
the Russians must either climb down now or fight, according to all 
appearances.'5 
 
Minister Uchida's diary extracts show that he was regularly meeting the new Chinese 
team in the Waiwupu. Towards the end of the year, Yuan Shikai, the powerful governor 
of Tianjin, seems to have got to grips with the fluid situation.6 
 
Uchida's report for 1903 stated that the Waiwupu leaders put out feelers, when war 
seemed inevitable, that they might contribute troops to the Japanese. Japan was, of 
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course, using the argument that she was mounting a campaign to rid Manchuria of the 
Russian troops; and that was also China's objective. So China's offer made good 
sense. Simultaneously Yuan Shikai said to one of his former Japanese military 
advisers, Lt Colonel Aoki Nobuzumi, that he was anxious to help. But China would, he 
said, defer to the wishes of the Japanese army, adding that he was 'anxious to build a 
strategy of [military] cooperation between China and Japan but, if Japan wanted China 
to stay neutral, that would be observed and he would tell the central government 
accordingly.' 7 
 
In order to consider these unofficial offers, there was a series of summit meetings in 
Tokyo around the end of the year. The negotiations with Russia had by this time failed 
and critical assessments about Japan's war capacity had to be addressed. These were 
initiated by Ito Hirobumi who was not confident of Japan's ability to beat Russia on her 
own and argued in favour of bringing the Chinese into the fighting. Detailed study  of 
these proposals terminated with the cabinet memorandum of 30 December. This 
considered two options: would China join Japan or stay neutral? They did not take into 
account the third possibility which Hart had considered, namely that China might throw 
in her lot with Russia. The conclusion reached was that it was not impossible that China 
would try to join in. But, from Japan's standpoint, China's participation was not 
necessary and not desired by the army leaders because of complications. Speaking 
more generally, China's involvement also  carried the political danger that it would give 
rise to further worldwide talk of the Yellow Peril. There was the additional more technical 
consideration that China's participation in operations alongside Japan might activate the 
secret Franco-Russian alliance and bring France into the war on Russia's side. That 
was to be avoided at all costs. 8 
 
Quite independently, global powers were worried lest China become a belligerent in that 
Russia might respond by calling on France to intervene alongside her. This would 
create a worldwide crisis. John Hay, the US secretary of state took the initiative (as he 
had earlier done in 1899) in discouraging China. It was of course of even greater 
relevance to Britain in the sense that France's involvement in the war might also draw 
Britain in under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The British minister in Beijing, 
Sir Ernest Satow, consulted his government and was told to persuade China to stay 
neutral. Britain which was by no means confident of Japanese military victory wanted to 
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avoid finding herself dragged into any war because of European antagonisms and 
genuinely feared the possibility of French cooperation with the Russians. The diplomatic 
body in Beijing was of one mind on this issue. 9 
 
So there was a clear international consensus that China's participation was to be 
discouraged and that she was to be urged to maintain 'strict neutrality'. On Japan's side, 
Minister Uchida was accordingly given instructions on 6 January 1904 to advise the 
Chinese leadership to stay out of the hostilities, 'if it comes to a collision between Japan 
and Russia'. Simultaneously Satow duly passed on London's views. On the whole, the 
Chinese seemed content to accept this advice. But there was still uncertainty and 
unpredictability. The Times' War in the Far East states 
 
'The case of China, momentarily in the background, may, however, at any 
moment come to the front, and no one who watches the trend of events in the 
Far East can view without misgiving the gradual and disquieting approach of a 
Chinese army towards the probable theatre of impending hostilities and the 
arrival of the Chinese Peiyang squadron at Chifu'. 10 
 
Even the Japanese had to admit: 'In case China joins of her own volition in spite of our 
advice, we can't be responsible.' They were still not convinced that China had finally 
decided and had to prepare for the contingency that she might change her mind as the 
fortunes of the war changed. 
 
The wide-ranging consideration which the Japanese cabinet gave to its policy at this 
time - which was equivalent to advance discussion of war aims - extended to two other 
areas : Korea and Fukien province.  So far as Korea was concerned, there was no 
attempt to discuss the issue of war with the Koreans as there had been with the 
Chinese. So far as Fukien was concerned, Japan's interest was in the security of 
Taiwan, then her only colony, and the worry that some European state would use the 
crisis to move in. The latter was identified in the long-term as a Japanese sphere of 
influence.11 
 
War Years 
The formal declarations of China's neutrality were made on 12/13 February. There were 
of course anomalies in China's neutrality declaration in that she wanted it to apply to the 
whole of the Middle Kingdom in order to demonstrate that her sovereignty applied in 
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Manchuria even though she did not exercise effective control there. The main notice 
stated:  
 
'local authorities have been instructed to keep order in their districts and to 
extend protection to the commercial and Christian populations. Mukden and 
Hsinking being the sites of the Imperial Mausolea and Palaces the Governor-
general has been given instructions to guard them with the greatest vigilance... 
Chinese troops stationed in these provinces shall not attack the troops of the 
belligerent countries nor shall the latter be allowed to attack the former.'  
 
But Russia and Japan already had garrisons of sorts in Manchuria so the neutrality 
rules had to be modified in their application to that territory.  
 
'In Manchuria there are localities still in occupation by foreign troops and beyond 
the reach of the power of China, where the enforcement of the rules of neutrality 
will, it is feared, be impossible. The Three Eastern Provinces as well as the rights 
pertaining thereto may gain victory and shall not be occupied by either of the 
Powers now at war.' 12 
 
China also issued separate notices to both countries, appealing to them not to violate 
her territory in Manchuria. But Japan responded that, so far as neutrality was 
concerned, her armies had to have freedom of action in Manchuria. This generated an 
air of resignation that China was doomed to suffer if war came. Hart summed up the 
position realistically : 'Both Russia and Japan desire expansion - at China's cost'.13 
 
There is some evidence in Japanese sources that China's leaders were evidently 
prepared to go beyond strict neutrality and intended to follow a policy of 'benevolent 
neutrality' towards Japan. Prince Ching in his discussions with Minister Uchida seems to 
have spoken of 'secret assistance' being given to Japan. 14 
 
As soon as the war began early in February, the Chinese government came up against 
not only these legal but also practical problems surrounding neutrality. Russia and 
Japan presented her with lists of contraband items. China accordingly had to prohibit 
the movement of rice and other foodstuffs from her treaty ports to Manchuria and 
Korea. Neutrality also required  belligerent vessels to leave her territorial waters or be 
interned. But China was too weak to enforce this order and both Japan and Russia took 
advantage of this. 
 
Neutral commercial powers like European countries also applied pressure to ensure 
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that their trade would continue uninterruptedly at the treaty ports. Hart who was one of 
the Chinese government officials most affected by trade recorded that he found it hard 
to deal with the various neutral countries who wanted their trade (often in arms) 'at, and 
through, the treaty ports to go on with the belligerents as usual.' In a circular note of 
January 1905 Russia complained of China violating neutrality in favour of Japan. But 
The Times summed up its conclusion by saying that China was blameless 'within the 
limits of her impotence to prevent infractions of neutrality by the belligerents.' 15    
 
Although the Chinese government declared neutrality, there is evidence of individual 
Chinese cooperating with both the Japanese and the Russians in the war zones. 
Evidence  on this issue is naturally patchy. The memoirs of foreign observers of the war 
on both sides reprinted in the Global Oriental series are one source of such information. 
In the operations around Port Arthur, Ashmead Bartlett writes of Chinese spying for the 
Russians about the exact location of General Nogi's headquarters during the siege; but 
the problem was that General A.M. Stoessel who was the commander-in-chief of the 
garrison, did not know whether to believe the intelligence he received from such 
quarters or not. It is probable that private, non-government Chinese were also working 
with the Russians on a strictly monetary basis, say in the role of interpreter. On the 
other hand, several authors write that there was covert Chinese military cooperation 
with Japan throughout the war. Certainly the hunhutzes (bandits) provided a useful 
service for the Japanese by cutting Russian field telegraph lines. The Japanese made 
much use of Chinese coolies (what would later be described as labour battalions), for 
example in digging trenches or carrying sacks of coal for Japan's temporary military 
railway tracks (gunyo tetsudo). 16 
  
It was one thing to declare neutrality but quite another to forecast the outcome of the 
war. In China's eyes, the Russian army had a high reputation; and it was therefore 
unwise to alienate the Russian military. Initially there was a sort of phoney land war. 
Japan was ready for hostilities; but thawing roads in Korea were so impassable that it 
was the end of April before she crossed the Yalu river and began campaigning in 
Manchuria. On the other hand, the Russian minister defended his country by telling 
China that Russia had been taken unawares and 'was neither prepared nor preparing.' 
With this in mind, some Chinese speculated that Russia would win in the end when their 
preparations took effect. Hart wrote: 
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'Chinese [opinion] is divided : some are sure the Russians must win eventually 
and trim accordingly - others are believers in Japan, but among them an ugly 
feature is developing for they begin to gloat over and express the conviction that 
the next step will be for Japan to rid China of every foreigner!' 17 
 
Some Chinese were still inclined to the view that with reinforcements Russia would 
prevail, but the majority were impressed with the skill shown by the Japanese armies. 
Naturally China's indecisive approach altered with the changing fortunes of the land 
war; and that meant that China became less favourable to Russia, the longer the war 
went on. The battle of Liaoyang in September 1904 seems to have been the decisive 
turning-point in Chinese thinking. Thereafter the Chinese lost confidence in the 
Russians as they went into retreat.  
 
One has to bear in mind that there was a whole apparatus of Chinese government 
administration operating in Manchuria where fighting was taking place. The two armies 
were operating in regions where Chinese viceroys, governors, mayors, magistrates, 
army and police were responsible for jurisdiction. Inevitably there were conflicts of 
authority. A typical clash of interests took place at Nyuchuang which, with the port of 
Yinkow, was the hub of Manchuria's bean trade. It had been a topic of strategic 
disagreement on the Russian side since one party including the commander-in-chief, 
General Kuropatkin, favoured its early evacuation. During the occupation China had 
initially chosen a Russian national as her Customs Inspector in order to avoid 
antagonizing the Russian army but, as it withdrew, substituted  a neutral American. 
Nyuchuang was occupied without a fight by the Japanese in July, the first major town to 
be capturedin the war. The Chinese authorities then selected a Japanese national from 
its customs staff. But this did not satisfy the Kuantung army who insisted on having their 
own man appointed. It also refused initially to allow the new Chinese Taotai into the city. 
The Japanese were genuinely surprised that the Chinese did not hail them as deliverers 
and seemed to regret the departure of the Russians. 18 
 
The Foreign Ministry always vigilant that the military was behaving high-handedly felt 
impelled to intervene. It sent over Yoshizawa Kenkichi who had had five years' 
experience of dealing with the Chinese to hold a watching brief. He was still a young 
man of 31 at this stage but later became an important figure in foreign policy-making. 
He went over in the second half of September 1904 and returned to Japan early in the 
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new year. During his three months' stay he had to work out acceptable arrangements 
between the army, the Chinese and the foreign merchant community. 19 
 
Both armies lived off the land. This was especially true for the Japanese when the siege 
of Port Arthur took so much longer than had been expected and food and other supplies 
became very scarce. Both armies lived in tents for the most part - what General Ian 
Hamilton described as 'sleeping a la belle etoile'. But he described himself as one of 
very few of the tens of thousands of Russians and Japanese who had a roof over his 
head for most of the time and was grateful for the facilities which the Japanese offered 
him. He uses various expressions to describe his accommodation: 'not a bad little 
house', 'a hut', 'this hovel'.20  The Japanese had to requisition Chinese homes for living 
accommodation for their generals who were content to be billeted in unpretentious 
places. They had to rely on quite modest Chinese buildings for headquarters, hospitals 
etc. By contrast, the Russians were to some extent able to use railway rolling stock for 
accommodation for their top brass. Japan requisitioned cargo boats, carts and bullock-
wagons for transport, but Russia seems to have had less of a supply problem because 
of the railway. Railways, Customs and Telegraphs became the preserve of the 
occupier. For postal services both sides appear to have used the Chinese system, 
though not exclusively. In the war situation things inevitably went wrong. Villages, 
houses and property were set on fire from time to time. On occasion crops (say of 
kiaoliang) were destroyed for strategic purposes. Evidence of this is given in the 
compensation claims that China presented at the end of the war. 
 
How did the Chinese regard these two sets of intruders? The attitude of the Manchurian 
Chinese is hard to assess. They had not raised a finger in 1894 to defend themselves 
and their land against the Japanese. One factor affecting them in 1904 was that they 
had known the Russians as occupiers for a few years. They were inclined to look at the 
newcomers with suspicion. Because the Japanese and Russians were rather reserved 
in their statements on this problem and perhaps reluctant to report about it, one has to 
rely much on the evidence in the writings of the foreign correspondents in the Global 
Oriental series. Ian  Hamilton asked a Chinese Post Commandant on whom he was 
billeted what he thought about the Russian troops, clearly expecting some  
condemnation of them. The reply was that 'they were kind men who paid for what they 
took,' adding that 'they were wanting in humanity'.21 Maurice Baring suggests that one 
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reason why it appeared that Russians were liked was that Chinese contractors were 
able to extract payments well over the market rate.   
 
Individually Chinese received much cruel treatment. Many of them sought work on the 
periphery of the war, serving as informants and spies or operating as black marketeers. 
If they were caught, they were liable to be ruthlessly punished. Maurice Baring tells the 
story of a Chinese who had committed some crime in the war zone. He was given the 
choice of punishment by the local Chinese magistrate or a Cossack. He said he would 
prefer neither; but he eventually chose the Cossack.22  It was a cruel society; and the 
Russian might seem to be less of a disciplinarian than the local Chinese official. Neither 
the Russians nor the Japanese had more than a smattering of Chinese; and military law 
tended to be very arbitrary. Hence punishment often caused offence. So far as 'coolies' 
were concerned, it tended to be the men of Shantung who were recruited for labouring 
jobs as they were to be later for the western front in 1917. It would require much work in 
the Chinese, Russian and Japanese archives to discover how widespread the use of 
Chinese workers was. If it was widespread, it suggests that the number of those 
engaged in the war was greater than has previously been recognized.23  
 
The Portsmouth and Peking Treaties 
It was a relief to all concerned that a conference to negotiate the ending of hostilities 
was held from 10 August in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. It led to the signing of the 
Portsmouth treaty and its protocols on 5 September. After being duly ratified in October, 
ratifications were exchanged in Washington in November. China which felt she was 
entitled to a voice in the future of Manchuria had  considered asking to be represented 
at Portsmouth but eventually decided against it - perhaps wisely. 
 
The Portsmouth treaty could only take effect when the various aspects of land and 
railway rights conferred on the two parties were confirmed by China.  Japan had all 
along realized that it would be necessary to negotiate with China if she won the war and 
Minister Uchida had spent a prolonged period in Tokyo (20/12/04 -18/1/05) preparing 
the way for Japan's postwar plan (jikyoku shori hosaku).24  The result was the Peking 
Conference of November-December which became an essential part of the peace 
settlement but tends to be overlooked by historians. The Portsmouth treaty had 
emerged as the result of bitter negotiations and was unquestionably important; but the 
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subsequent Peking treaties which established Japan's new rights were equally essential 
for the future.  
 
Japan's chief delegate, Komura Jutaro, returned from the US unwell and with a heavy 
heart. He knew that the Portsmouth treaty which he had negotiated was a profound 
disappointment to the Japanese people who felt that their wartime sacrifices had not 
been recognized or rewarded. The newspapers reported that on his return to Tokyo, 
there were no street decorations in evidence in marked contrast to the displays which 
had earlier greeted the generals and admirals on their return from the front.25 
 
When he took up the reins of office at the Foreign Ministry, Komura gave priority to the 
urgent task of negotiating some of the clauses of the Portsmouth treaty with China, the 
sovereign power. His prime aim was to deal with south and central Manchuria by 
securing China's agreement  to the transfer from Russia of the Liaotung peninsula and 
the agreed section of the Russian railway. But equally important was his secondary aim 
in Russian-occupied Manchuria. Like the Open Door powers United States and Britain, 
Japan wanted the opening of ports in the river systems of northern Manchuria as this 
seemed to be the surest way of preventing Russia from establishing a sphere of interest 
there. Russia had in the past opposed such measures and had not permitted the 
presence in her sphere of influence of consuls from the other powers. But Witte  after a 
lot of argument and persuasion at Portsmouth had withdrawn his objections to this; and 
it was now Komura's ambition to obtain the confirmation of China. He regarded this 
latter objective as so important that, much to the surprise of everyone, he decided to go 
in person to Beijing and to set off for the Chinese capital within a month of his return 
from the United States.  
 
Under pressure from an excited public opinion, the Chinese delegates were not in an 
easy position. At the Peking Conference which opened on 17 November China was 
represented by Prince Ching, the weak head of the Waiwupu, and Na-tung, a pro-
Japanese member. But their most powerful plenipotentiary was Yuan Shikai, the 
viceroy of Tianjin. One difference which observers noted was the increased confidence 
which the Chinese delegates displayed, compared to previous occasions. Hart 
commented 'The pluck of Japan in facing Russia has electrified China.' Japan's 
performance in the war had encouraged the growth of Chinese nationalism.26  
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Understandably Japan did not welcome being the target of China's nationalist 
aspirations. Negotiations did not proceed well.  Yuan as chief delegate put forward a 
substantial demand for compensation for damage to Chinese property during the war. 
China had all along foreseen that she would have to bear the brunt of rehabilitating the 
provinces of Manchuria. She entered into negotiations wanting money for 
reconstruction; but Japan which had received no indemnity and was in a grim financial 
state and in no mood to help. The Chinese delegates had also received many petitions 
calling on them to use the opportunity to revoke all the 'concessions' which had hitherto 
been made over Manchuria. This seemed reasonable enough since the Japanese 
negotiators boasted that they had liberated Chinese territory by their own blood and 
treasure and made provision for the removal of military forces fropm vast tracts of 
Chinese territory.27  Since the transfer of the Russian concession to Japan was her 
primary demand, it can be understood how prickly discussion became. If the Chinese 
did not succeed in eliminating these concessions, they were at least determined to 
ensure that Japan did not fall heir to the privileges which Russia had accumulated over 
the years. The Japanese did not appreciate these arguments and felt that the Chinese 
were showing unreasonable obstructiveness and ingratitude. The presence of the 
Japanese armies in strength not too distant from the Chinese capital was probably one 
factor in achieving a breakthrough in the talks. Eventually by a combination of patience 
and threats, Komura and his team managed to obtain China's general approval of the 
terms on offer. 
 
Komura deliberately avoided discussion with China on how much remained of the 
unexpired Russian lease of the Liaotung peninsula. Russia's lease of 1898 had been for 
25 years and was due to expire in 1923. Japan, deprived of a financial indemnity, could 
hardly contemplate building a new railway network if only 17 years of the lease were 
left. But for Japan to have raised the matter would inevitably have caused controversy 
with the Chinese. Komura considered it was better to leave it to be discussed closer to 
the date when the lease would run out. The Chinese themselves do not seem to have 
raised the issue. 
 
Komura was under pressure from a large cohort of Japanese newspaper 
correspondents in the Chinese capital. Jiji Shimpo, hearing of the opposition Komura 
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was facing from the Chinese, called on him  to break off negotiations. Instead he 
proceeded to sign. He told the British minister that he had not got all he wanted but had 
secured the two main points: the transfer of the agreed section of the railway and the 
Liaotung peninsula as well as the opening of 16 places to trade, including Harbin.28   
 
The Manchurian treaties (as they are called in Japan) consisted of a main treaty (3 
articles), a Supplementary Agreement (12 articles) and an important secret note 
(sometimes called a Protocol) consisting of 14 items. They were signed on 22 
December 1905. Regarding the Kwantung Leased Territory, China undertook to 
transfer the territory and all rights connected with it and the southern branch of the 
Russian-controlled Chinese Eastern Railway  between Port Arthur and Changchun with 
its branches and coal-mines to Japan. China agreed  to conform to the original Sino-
Russian Agreement. She would have restored to her all portions of Manchuria occupied 
or under control of Japanese and Russian troops. Under the Supplement Japan 
secured China's agreement to the opening of 16 ports in Manchuria to foreign trade and 
residence. Though this looked like an enlightened Open Door experiment, it turned out 
that the Japanese military in occupation in Manchuria were as little inclined as the 
Russians to welcome foreign traders for the time being. They wanted monopoly 
privileges since they had come off second best in the peace settlement. The Protocol 
allowed Japan to assist the Chinese in building the Changchung-Kirin and Mukden-
Sinmintin lines. Japan received a concession to improve the military railway between 
Antung and Mukden and to operate it for 15 years. But the Chinese promised not to 
build a line to compete with the South Manchurian Railway, the network the Japanese 
were about to establish. Ratification in Japan took place within two months on 29 
January 1906. Both parties exchanged ratifications in Peking and the treaties were 
published on 31 January. Meanwhile the Russians were satisfactorily re-negotiating 
their position in northern Manchuria.29  
 
It rested with the former belligerents to build up their commercial empires in the new 
situation. As the armies came to be evacuated, trade was restored. The Chinese 
merchants on the spot were able to hold their own with their new rivals. One observer 
who toured Manchuria in 1908 wrote 
 
'It is evident that the Japanese have captured none of the Chinese trade in 
 13 
Manchuria; Chinese are not to be beaten on their own ground..... A factor that 
the Japanese will have to surmount is the undoubted want of goodwill of the 
Chinese, amounting often to intense ill-will. China herself has exchanged the 
non-commercial Muskovite for a nation rapidly rising in the industrial world. But 
the Chinaman does not love him for this.'30 
 
Without the Peking Conference, the situation created by the negotiations at Portsmouth 
would not have been legitimate. Japan need not have taken the trouble to negotiate 
directly with China over what she had taken by military means. But it is all to the credit 
of Komura that he decided to take the hazardous course of negotiating with the Chinese 
in their new mood of nationalism. He clearly wanted to legitimize Japan's long-term 
ambitions in the region. 
 
The Peking Conference has its echoes throughout the first half of the twentieth century. 
It was at the heart of the Twenty-one Demands crisis of 1915 where the length of the 
lease of Port Arthur was at issue; it recurred in the run-up to the Manchurian crisis 
where Japan condemned China for breaking her guarantee not to compete in railway 
building. On the other hand it was possible for Japan and Russia to patch up 
agreements over the division of Manchuria in 1907, 1910 and 1912. So at least stability 
was at last re-established in the area. 
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British Naval Estimation of Japan and Russia, 1894-1905 
John W M Chapman 
 
‘… a rough estimate, so far as this is possible, of the Naval and Military operations 
that would immediately follow on the outbreak of hostilities might prove a most 
valuable guide to our own diplomacy.’ - A.J. Balfour to Lord Selborne, 21 December 
1903. 1    
 
Introduction 
At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the US naval attaché in London, 
Commander Stockton, filed a current estimate of the condition of the British Navy: 
 
1. The outbreak of war between Russia and Japan finds this country in an 
advanced state of preparation beyond its actual peace needs. This 
preparation has been going on since I have been here on duty, and 
although the increase of forces in China has not been so great as the 
increase of the forces in the Mediterranean, the Channel Fleet and in 
the Home Fleet, these three large forces are always available for the 
reinforcement of the forces in China, and also for any European 
complication. 
 
2. I consider the British Navy now in first class condition and in better 
shape than it has been within my recollection. This remark applies to 
both personnel and material.….2 
 
Stockton’s view is amplified by a subsequent report that ‘it is now recognized in 
Great Britain at least that a preparedness for war is the condition of absolute 
efficiency absolutely requisite in a great Naval or Military department , and in this 
state all other conditions must be subservient’.3  
 
Cabinet Perceptions 
These contemporary assessments accurately reflect the change in the position of the 
Admiralty in British policymaking which can be traced to the replacement of Goschen 
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as 1st Lord of the Admiralty by Lord Selborne in October 1900 in the middle of the 
South African War. Linked to this change is the decision apparently taken by 
Selborne as a direct result of his encounter with Admiral Sir John Fisher at Malta in 
April 1901 to accept Fisher’s interpretation of naval organization and his evident 
rejection of the criticisms and objections to Fisher’s thinking on the part of his 
Cabinet colleagues and members of his Board of Admiralty. Selborne had explained 
his change of heart in relation to matters of personnel to Goschen in December 
1902: 
 
At any rate my mind was made up as to the principles a year ago & my main 
object in getting Fisher to the Admiralty was to bring there a man whom I 
knew would sympathize with my views and had exactly the qualities required 
to give effect to them.4 
 
Selborne's father-in-law, Lord Salisbury, appears to have been prejudiced against 
admirals in his later years, partly because, as foreign secretary until October 1900 as 
well as prime minister, he thought admirals incapable of keeping secrets and trusted 
the War Office much more for military intelligence purposes in relation to the 
expenditure of the Secret Service vote. 5  Salisbury was also sceptical about 
Selborne’s proposals for the alliance with Japan, suggesting that such a move 
should not be undertaken until the outcome of the war in South Africa was settled, 
but Arthur Balfour, as 1st Lord of the Treasury in the Commons, had responded more 
positively in October 1901 to Selborne’s proposal put to the Cabinet a month before, 
which ‘seems to put your case with the utmost lucidity’ and financially was not 
‘immoderate’: 
 
It forms, however, only a part – though perhaps the most important part – of 
our Imperial policy – military, financial and diplomatic – which I frankly admit 
gives me at the present moment the greatest anxiety.6 
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By April 1902, when it had become clearer that he would become prime minister in 
succession to uncle Salisbury, Balfour promised to discuss naval subjects with 
Selborne whenever he chose, although he found it ‘extremely difficult to believe that 
we have, as you seem to suppose, much to fear from Germany, in the immediate 
future at all events.’7 After becoming prime minister in June 1902, Balfour received 
copies of the papers drawn up by the Winchester House Conference at the end of 
July from Selborne, who wanted them examined and ratified, preferably by a cabinet 
committee of Balfour’s choice. Initially, Balfour wanted to delegate the task to the 
‘Defence Council’ presided over by the Duke of Devonshire. The Duke, however, 
seems not to have understood what was wanted of him and his council and said at 
the end of September 1902 to Selborne that he ‘never understood that you wanted 
my authority to make the proposed reply to the Japanese’. Balfour when discussing 
the terms of the reply had indicated that, while agreeing with the general tenour of 
the reply, he took exception to the suggestion in the War Office account that some 
British troops were being considered for any allied operations in Manchuria when 
‘the Japanese do not suggest aiding us in India’. The inertia of the Duke, however, 
was interpreted by Balfour as conduct he regarded as ‘superfluously vicious’ and this 
was echoed by St.John Brodrick, the secretary for war, as ‘quite intolerable’. In the 
end, Balfour had to step in, convert it into the Committee for Imperial Defence (CID) 
and in November 1902 determined that if the alliance were to be activated in future, 
the Committee would have the right to go for fresh advice direct to the Directors of 
Military and Naval Intelligence (who had drawn up the agreements under the broad 
guidance of the Foreign Office in the first place) without first consulting their heads of 
department.8 
 
In all his discussions as prime minister until May 1905,Balfour understood Selborne’s 
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argument that, should Japan’s position be seriously undermined in its conflict with 
Russia, Britain ‘could not permit Japan to be crushed’. However, as the crisis 
between the two countries unfolded, Balfour viewed ‘with a little misgiving the 
superior strength which Russia appears to possess in those seas’ and after 
consultation with Lansdowne recommended an augmentation of British forces on the 
China Station.9 This position was implemented by Selborne and Battenberg with 
changes to the standing orders of all the naval stations east of Suez and with the 
appointment of Vice-Admiral Noel as putative commander of a combined Eastern 
Fleet in November 1903.10  As the situation in the Far East became increasingly 
grave, however, Balfour as chairman of the CID returned to the service intelligence 
chiefs to provide it with forecasts ‘with regard to the probable course of hostilities, 
should they break out, between Russia and Japan, in the early Spring.’11 Selborne 
had already been in touch with Lansdowne and had suggested joint intervention with 
the French and Americans to persuade the Russians to meet the Japanese demand 
for pre-eminence in Korea, but Balfour correctly pointed out to Selborne that the 
Japanese had already refused any joint intervention in favour of bilateral 
negotiations.12  Balfour conceded that the Russians could not hope to settle the 
dispute by invading Japan, but he thought they could easily occupy Korea and he 
was worried that the Japanese were hoping to obtain British support to prevent this.  
Balfour had just been involved with the perceived failure of the Japanese side to 
purchase two Chilean warships building in British yards, regarded their inaction as 
‘dilatoriness’, and Britain had had to intervene to prevent their purchase by Russia, 
with the result that Balfour considered this made the Japanese position ‘either as 
negotiators or as combatants, almost hopeless, unless they secure an ally’.13  
 
Balfour considered that it was best to leave the Japanese to work out their own 
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solution and for them to ask for any British mediation: ‘there is nothing either in the 
letter or the spirit of our Treaty which requires us to share in a contest, with which we 
are not immediately concerned’. He followed up with more detailed observations on 
29 December 1903: 
 
If we interpret the Japanese Alliance as one requiring us to help Japan 
whenever she gets to loggerheads with Russia, it is absurdly one-sided. 
Japan certainly would not help us to prevent Amsterdam falling into the 
hands of the French, or Holland falling into the hands of Germany. Nor would 
she involve herself in any quarrel we might have over the north-west frontier 
of India. 
 
Balfour appears to have been convinced that the Russian naval forces were superior 
to those of Japan, but was nevertheless convinced that Russia would not remain 
unscathed even if Japan came off worse in naval operations and concluded: 
 
It must be remembered that though Russia’s resources in men are unlimited, 
her resources in money are not, and that, if she chooses  to squander both 
her naval and her financial strength in this extreme corner of the world,she is 
rendering herself impotent elsewhere.14  
 
Selborne passed Balfour’s letter on to Kerr, who promised a reply once he had 
conferred with Battenberg. Kerr replied on 30 December 1903 that any answer to a 
query about Japan’s chances against Russia ‘must necessarily only be one of 
surmise’. However, both men agreed that odds were presently in favour of Japan, 
but that this could change if one side or the other could bring reinforcements to the 
front line and concluded that ‘if both receive reinforcements Russia would 
preponderate’.15 
 
Global Economic Dimensions 
Balfour felt much more at home with the economics of world affairs and was equally 
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aware, like Lansdowne, that Japan was a poor country short of the funds required to 
pursue its ambitious domestic agenda of modernization. The British victory in South 
Africa ensured that the bulk of the world’s gold supply would be in British hands, but 
the Japanese leadership recognized that it was extremely important at all times to 
emphasize that Japan’s external demands coincided with those of Britain and the 
USA in terms of the maintenance of the ‘Open Door’ in China. Selborne, too, 
appears to have relied heavily on the advice of City opinion through his cousin, Lord 
Radstock, and took the fundamental line that under no circumstances must Britain 
get into serious disputes with the USA. The difficulty such disputes would create for 
the defence of Canada in particular and the theoretical possibility of the US making 
common cause with Germany impelled Selborne into acceptance of the need to 
scale down the British naval presence in the Caribbean, the western Pacific and the 
eastern Atlantic, an analysis which fitted in well with the notions of Fisher, who had 
been C-in-C in North America during the Spanish-American conflict and championed 
the notion of concentrating the fleet in European waters and abandoning the policy of 
a presence in all distant waters. Fisher sought to promote closer relations with the 
US Navy and encouraged interchanges with many of its officers to obtain technical 
and managerial information on the practices being developed by them. Fisher was 
certainly in contact with Stockton while C-in-C at Portsmouth, and Harry White in the 
US Embassy in London was someone with a direct connection with President 
Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt in turn had a close personal relationship with Cecil 
Spring-Rice, the 1st Secretary of the British Embassy at St.Petersburg, and issued 
instructions for contact to be maintained with Spring-Rice by US diplomats ‘without 
reserve’. 16  When making estimates of Russia and Japan during the 
Russo-Japanese War, therefore, it is important to be aware of the fact that Roosevelt 
was shown and approved in advance the text of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and 
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played an important role in promoting a joint Anglo-American loan to Japan after it 
was clear that the Japanese forces would play an effective role in restraining 
Russian expansion in China.17   
 
Roosevelt in 1905 stated that he had been consulted by both the Japanese and the 
British and was of the view that it was entirely reasonable for the Japanese to assert 
their right to a sphere of influence in Korea, as much presumably as it had been for 
the US to assert its position against Spain in 1898.18 Roosevelt, in an apparently 
trenchant criticism of Britain, was adamant that establishing a strong US Navy would 
ensure that there would be no future Japanese threat to the United States, and 
asserted that ‘if the menace comes I believe we could be saved only by our own 
efforts and not by an alliance with any one else.’19  
 
The Admirals Pronounce 
The professional sailors, mainly those on the Admirals’ List, supplied a considerable 
range of advice to the 1st Lord of the Admiralty and his Cabinet colleagues, though it 
has to be remembered that Selborne had personal friends in the Navy, such as 
Hedworth Lambton, who were able to express views on professional issues that did 
not rest on rank or position. Selborne also had a middle-ranking officer as a personal 
secretary. Initially until 1902, this was Captain Fawkes, subsequently replaced by 
Captain Hugh Tyrwhitt, who was recommended by Fisher and continued under Lord 
Cawdor after Selborne resigned to become Governor-General of South Africa. Then 
the members of the Board of Admiralty, the composition and duties of whose 
members were revised in 1895, provided the principal advice and decisions. The 
civilian Secretary and his assistants provided the administrative back-up and the 1st 
Lord often consulted former holders of the office, particularly Goschen and Spencer, 
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as well as other prominent individuals, such as Lord Brassey. 
 
Internally, the 1st Lord was able to appoint and consult with the commanders-in-chief 
on the individual naval stations at home and abroad, as well as with the directors of 
departments within the Admiralty. An energetic 1st Lord, like Selborne, however, was 
always able to consult directly with individual specialists, though generally he would 
consult the member of his Board with the relevant oversight. 20  The principal 
professional adviser was the Senior Naval (or 1st Sea) Lord, a role occupied by Lord 
Walter Kerr from 1899 to 1904 and by Sir John Fisher from October 1904. Kerr’s 
view of Russia and Japan was not unlike that of President Roosevelt. When invited 
to comment on Selborne’s cabinet paper of September 1901 recommending the 
alliance with Japan, Kerr claimed to welcome any reasonable move that would 
provide relief for a fleet that was feeling the heat of international competition from 
other industrially developed countries at a time when the war in South Africa was 
generating increasingly heavy financial burdens. However, Kerr in practice showed a 
degree of reluctance to place any great faith in the word of an Oriental country: his 
resolve varied between a position of urging that Britain rely on its own resources to 
deal with Russia in the Far East and one of seeking to withdraw as much naval 
firepower as possible from the Far East despite the terms of the additional secret 
naval protocol accompanying the alliance with Japan.  
 
Kerr based his own professional activity on the support of individual admirals with 
whom he was comfortable and which he represented as ‘the Admiralty point of view’: 
former directors of naval intelligence, such as L. A. Beaumont and Cyprian Bridge 
and prominent flag officers such as Domvile and Noel. Hedworth Lambton had in 
1898, however, ‘generally criticised the whole of the Flag List, coming to the 
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conclusion that there were not many able men on it’.21 This situation stemmed in 
large part from the fact that the Royal Navy had not had to engage in any serious 
combat for a whole century and as an organization was rather complacent. In war 
with Russia, the alliance with France and Turkey had made it possible to land forces 
on the Crimean Peninsula without excessive difficulty.22 
 
The contemporaneous C-in-C in the East Indies & China Station, Admiral Sir James 
Stirling, had been censured in December 1855 when the Admiralty recorded ‘their 
disappointment at the Russian ships in the Gulph of Tartary having been allowed to 
escape the vigilance of his Squadron’.23 In the case of Japan, Stirling’s successors, 
Hope and Kuper, took the lead in suppressing the resistance of the Satsuma and 
Chôshû forces in 1862-64, when both Lord Walter Kerr and Reginald Custance had 
been present, and the experience impressed on both daimyô the wisdom of learning 
about the requisite technology that had subordinated the Pacific to its demands. 24 
 
Problems of Communication 
What comes across very clearly in these accounts is the slowness of contacts both 
across the Indian and Pacific Oceans and between the Far East and London. What 
greatly reduced the problem was the opening up of more rapid communications in 
the second half of the 19th century by competing land telegraph lines and submarine 
cables. The first was promoted by the Russian government in conjunction with the 
Danish-owned Great Northern Co., which purchased a monopoly of Japan’s 
international cable links by laying a submarine cable to Nagasaki. The second was 
developed by the Eastern Extension Co. which controlled cable and telegraph links 
as far as Shanghai to service the British business enterprises which dominated the 
China trade. North of Shanghai, however, the land telegraph linked the two systems 
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under cartel arrangements which effectively froze out third parties and countries such 
as Japan. Nominally, these lines were under the control of the central Chinese 
government, but as it was mainly anxious about British and French activities, it 
looked from 1861 primarily to the Russians for protection and ceded land and 
commercial concessions in return. 
 
The telegraph lines to Beijing and Nagasaki were vital tools in the hands of the 
Russian Army and Navy, as they linked St.Petersburg with the Russian military 
agents in China and with the Russian Pacific Squadron anchorage in winter at 
Nagasaki, as well as the diplomatic and consular networks in China and Japan. 
Especially following the construction of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern 
railway networks with funds raised mainly in Paris and Berlin after 1890, the Russian 
government developed the shortest, fastest and most direct communication between 
Europe and the Far East. Essentially, it was the superior Russian communications 
facilities which enabled their armed forces to outwit the War Office and the Admiralty 
in the 1890s and we now know that the Russians were able to lean on the Great 
Northern to inform them about the activities of other countries. The Japanese made 
heavy use of the route through Russia for communication with their diplomatic and 
consular posts not just in Europe, but also in America even after the conquest of 
Formosa in 1895 enabled them to begin to shake free from the Great Northern 
stranglehold via Amoy and Shanghai. However, an Eastern-Great Northern cartel in 
China yielded not just copies of Great Northern traffic to Russian agencies, but also 
provided insights into shared Eastern traffic as well.  
 
The War Office, accustomed to the tricks the Russians resorted to, partly as a result 
of the close harmony of the DGMI in London with the Intelligence Bureau at Simla, 
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produced numerous detailed intelligence reports about Russian activities in the 
Balkans, Central Asia and then in the Far East. The Admiralty, by contrast, was 
aware of the wider strategic naval problems affecting Russia in the Baltic and Black 
Seas and discounted Russian naval activity in the Far East. The result was that the 
Naval Intelligence Department (NID), for which a need was felt only from the 1880s, 
proved woefully inadequate between 1894 and 1900 in estimating the significance of 
Russia and Japan. On the eve of the Triple Intervention, for example, Admiral 
Beaumont (DNI) produced a comparative table of British, French and Russian naval 
capabilities in the Pacific, but informed Lord Spencer that he had no means of 
judging why the Russians had left Nagasaki for Chifu and were actively reinforcing 
their Pacific squadron.25 Perceptions on the spot about the scale of the Japanese 
successes against China led to concern about the Japanese threat to Beijing 
dominating thinking and the Admiralty was compelled to dissuade Admiral Fremantle, 
the C-in-C in China, from trying to seize the Pescadores to counteract the Japanese 
advance to Formosa. The legation in Tokyo pointed to evidence from observing 
Japanese policy that ‘the incidents of the present war have conclusively shewn that 
the organization and efficiency of her Secret Service are perfect….’ 26 The fact, 
however, was that the Japanese Navy, which owed its operational successes mainly 
to torpedo-boats and British-supplied quick-firing guns, had no warships larger than 
5,000 tons and was awaiting delivery of its first battleships from British yards in 1896 
before it could begin to defend itself against the Russian, French or even German 
fleets. 
 
The scene for Russo-Japanese conflict was triggered by the German seizure of 
Kiaochow in November 1897 and directly by the Russian lease of Port Arthur in 
March 1898, which sparked the British acquisition of Wei-hai-wei (occupied by Japan 
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since 1895) and Kowloon. British naval units which had been sharing the harbour at 
Chifu with other fleets until then had maintained communication with London via land 
lines to Shanghai and Hong Kong but the Admiralty would have preferred a secure 
link directly with the new ‘port of assembly’ at Wei-hai-wei. Initially, however, a direct 
proposal was submitted via the London office of Great Northern to link Wei-hai-wei 
with Port Arthur and Kiaochow to Shanghai, but this was rejected by Beaumont as 
the ‘least desirable’ solution. In April 1898, Eastern proposed a submarine cable link 
with Wei-hai-wei via the Saddle Islands to Shanghai, saying that the cable was 
available in store at Singapore in return for the capital cost and an annual subsidy. 
Beaumont also rejected this by saying that he did not see why the Admiralty would 
accept such a costly arrangement just to suit the convenience of the company. A 
German proposal followed in January 1899 along similar lines, but this provoked the 
response that ‘a joint cable even with Germany is inadmissible’, particularly as 
Wei-hai-wei had to be regarded as ‘an advanced post in a hostile country’.27 
 
This characterization was amply reinforced, initially by the internal upheavals in 
China, but especially by the serious international crisis over Fashoda in the autumn 
of 1898 during which an indication was received that the Russians would support 
their French allies. 28  Admiral Seymour at Wei-hai-wei responded that he was 
concentrating his forces there and at Hong Kong, but in view of the threat to British 
trade routes by both French and Russian forces there was a debate about the best 
location for a single concentration of available units. Seymour laid out the options 
and requested Admiralty advice, but intelligence available in London suggested that 
the Russian forces were scattered and two French ships had left Indochina.29 Within 
the China Station, ships' commanders heard from Captain Jellicoe, Seymour’s 
chief-of-staff, of the exchange and appear to have urged concentration in the south 
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at Hong Kong because British trade there needed most protection.30 
 
However, the 1898 crisis also demonstrated unwillingness on the part of Beaumont 
to undertake any steps prior to the outbreak of any conflict. These included not 
liaising with the press, not giving any special protection to valuable cargoes taking 
routes open to hostile attack or making arrangements with the cable companies. In 
this last case, Beaumont insisted that this was ‘anticipating the arrangements which 
are proposed in the Report of the Committee on Telegraph Communications, & 
besides that the assent of the Admty to the course proposed would be acquiescing in 
their assumption that war is to be prepared for’. However, Beaumont’s view was 
overridden by Richards, who agreed to take up the Eastern Extension company’s 
offer to place its cable ships at the disposal of C-in-Cs ‘in the event of war breaking 
out and cable communication being temporarily severed’.31 The official Admiralty line, 
in contrast to the War Office, saw no need for cutting enemy cables automatically 
unless there were good operational reasons for doing so. In May 1898, however, the 
US naval command in the Philippines had cut the cable from Manila to Hong Kong 
with the intention of cutting the islands off from Spain so that US actions forced other 
countries to rethink their policies in the event of war at sea. 32   
 
The record shows that Admiral Fisher, the C-in-C on the North America Station, had 
been actively concerned during the Fashoda Crisis to prevent the consular cipher 
from falling into French hands and to exercise control over French and British cable 
ships operating on his Station.33 Admiral Seymour, Fisher’s best friend in the Service, 
complained between July and December 1898 about the unreliability of the overland 
cable between Wei-hai-wei and Shanghai during the China and Fashoda Crises. 
Following his transfer to the Mediterranean in 1899, Fisher found that the cable to 
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Odessa via Constantinople was controlled by Eastern Extension and initiated 
arrangements with the company to have access to those of the 2,500 cables daily 
passing over it through Syra in the Aegean that were to be regarded as ‘suspicious’ 
to be sent covertly to him at Malta. When the concession on the 
Odessa-Constantinople leg came due for renewal in 1903, the Admiralty successfully 
pressed during 1902 for the Turkish government to rebuff alternative proposals for it 
to be purchased by Russian or Great Northern interests.34  
 
Although Army and Navy initially demanded Wei-hai-wei be made a defended port 
and wanted Salisbury to encourage the Treasury to take a fresh look at the 
establishment of a submarine cable, the Boxer Uprising intervened in the summer of 
1900. An approach to the Chinese bureau of telegraphs, however, got nowhere and 
fresh approaches were suggested by the companies to lay an inexpensive cable to 
Wei-hai-wei from the Taku bridgehead which had been held by international naval 
units. This arrangement replaced the difficult links between the radio installed in the 
Taku north-west fort and HMS Arethusa lying offshore to relay important signals by 
ship to Wei-hai-wei. The compromise put forward by the companies under which the 
Great Northern cable-layer at Shanghai would link Wei-hai-wei with Chifu, Taku and 
Shanghai attracted the support of the Treasury, which had just completed the 
successful laying of the submarine cable to Capetown in February 1900. But it also 
chimed in with the notion of international co-operation to restore order in Beijing and 
to re-erect the rail and telegraph links from Beijing to the coast.35 Admiral Custance 
sought unavailingly to stipulate that this could only be a temporary peacetime 
solution but valueless in time of war. Lord Walter Kerr concluded that ‘the most 
disagreeable feature in the present arrangement is that it has been brought about by 
Russia barring the way’.36 Consequently, the British side continued to have access 
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to intercepts of French and Russian traffic in the Near East while in the Far East 
Great Northern could intercept Japanese and British traffic. Nevertheless, these 
experiences brought the processes of gathering intelligence and providing 
counter-intelligence through the contemporary communications systems within the 
Navy into much closer line with those in the British and Indian armies. 
 
The Issue of Security 
The key figures in naval developments were Fisher and Seymour. Fisher refined 
these processes even further between 1900 and 1902 in the Mediterranean through 
the harnessing of both cable and wireless to a modern system of command and 
control where the fleet acquired an apparatus of operational intelligence-gathering 
and assessment which was no longer dependent on consular and diplomatic support. 
Strategy in the Mediterranean effectively came to depend on naval ambushes and 
surprise attacks on Russian naval movements into the Aegean Sea in the first 
instance because the War Office refused to contemplate a landing on the Gallipoli 
peninsula before Selborne became 1st Lord of the Admiralty. Strategy in the Pacific 
rested on Selborne’s convictions that nothing must interfere with good relations 
between Britain and the USA and that an accord must be reached with Japan to 
bring the Russian juggernaut to a stop. But the fundamental ideas behind the last 
accord derive in very large measure from the correspondence exchanged between 
Seymour and Selborne from November 1900 to August 1901, especially the notion 
that Russia could be contained by an alliance with Japan in which Britain would act 
silently holding the ring as a benevolent neutral and in which Japan could not 
effectively complicate Britain’s objective of holding the balance of power in Europe.37 
 
The framework of the strategy could not be created without the active support of 
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Lansdowne, who first reported to Selborne on 7 March 1901 apropos the 
unsatisfactory triangle of Britain, Germany and Japan touted by Eckardstein at the 
Kaiser’s behest: ‘I think it just possible that the Japs may take the bit between their 
teeth.’38 The strategy, however, could also not be implemented without the support 
of the War Office and the most important bridge between Seymour and Selborne on 
the one hand and between Selborne and the War Office on the other was Fisher, 
though with a great deal of unseen support by the King and the Prince of Wales. 
Seymour’s advice of 24 March 1901 was received by Selborne at exactly the 
moment of Selborne’s confrontation with Fisher at Malta after which Selborne came 
to the conclusion that he must have Fisher at the Admiralty with his ‘genius for 
organization’ to carry through the radical reform of the Navy for which Selborne has 
received scant historical recognition. 
 
Ardagh (DGMI at the War Office) had served with Fisher in 1899 at the 1st Hague 
Conference and was aware through Altham of Grenfell’s support for Fisher’s ideas 
about countering Russian influence in the Mediterranean. His longstanding loathing 
of Russian ‘adventurism’ matched Fisher’s apprehension about the corrupt and 
devious methods of the Russians, although he remained sceptical about Fisher’s 
scenarios of Russian and French surprise attack. Army intelligence officers in 
general took a dim view of the unscrupulousness of Russian Army officers, such as 
the view that 
 
The one thing that impressed me most in China was the wholesale 
dishonesty of all ranks of Russian officers. They have no scruples, and 
consider everything fair in love, war, and everything else; judging by their 
greed for money it should be an extremely easy matter to purchase any 
information required concerning Russian military and naval secrets. 
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No one who has not read the history of the manner in which Russia has 
absorbed so much of Central and Eastern Asia in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century can possibly appreciate the wiles and cunning treachery 
of the Russian diplomatists and their secret service agents. 
 
His conclusion was that ‘it is a matter of general knowledge, as to be hardly worth 
mention, that in Russia the Cabinet Noir inspection of correspondence is carried out 
to an extent unequalled in any other country’.39 
 
Foreign Office experience in dealing with Russia during the war with Japan amply 
reaffirmed that the Okhrana would stop at nothing to obtain whatever evidence it 
could by break-ins and bribery in neutral diplomatic missions at St.Petersburg or in 
consular premises throughout Russia which would yield copies of codebooks or 
reports to throw light on Japanese operations and policy following the withdrawal of 
the Japanese mission to Stockholm in February 1904. Sir Thomas Sanderson, 
permanent under-secretary of state until 1906, was aware of the loss of the best 
British diplomatic cipher (Cypher L) in February 1899 through the negligence of a 
Chancery clerk at St.Petersburg, though a recent search of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry Archive (AVPRI) indicates that the cipher employed by Sanderson for secret 
service activities in November 1901 had been decrypted. Ambassador Hardinge 
subsequently provided detailed accounts of Russian covert activity against the British, 
US and Swedish missions and sought permission from Sanderson to have his own 
personal cipher for especially secret communications. However, Sanderson took the 
view that no cipher was unbreakable but that the only way to preserve secrecy was 
to exchange letters by courier.40 The Japanese in 1902 had come to the same 
conclusion and Minister Kurino at St. Petersburg had sought to enlist the Army and 
Navy in a combined courier service and both diplomatic services sought to vary their 
laboriously constructed cipher books through additive and subtraction methods. 
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The very first demand put to the British side at Yokosuka in May 1902 was a request 
by Admiral Yamamoto to Admiral Bridge for access to the all-British cable network in 
order to avoid reliance on Great Northern. He also sought access to lengths of cable 
and cable-layers to establish direct links between the Navy in Tokyo and fleet 
headquarters in southern Korea after the outbreak of war. Both requests involved the 
co-operation of Eastern, but in both cases it was impossible as a neutral to avoid all 
contact in China with the cartel arrangements with Great Northern and the 
trans-Pacific route via Manila did not come into operation before 1905. Proposals 
also included co-operation in constructing an allied naval cipher and the Admiralty 
did produce an inter-allied cipher which, however, does not appear to have come into 
operation until 1914 and was not an instant success because the Japanese had had 
no practice in using it. The Army insisted on retaining its own ciphers and operating 
these on the all-British system to link its attachés and liaison personnel. In 1907, 
however, the War Office warned the Japanese about wartime bribery of Eastern 
employees and the loss of one cipher, but appear not to have mentioned the activity 
of a Russian agent at Hong Kong named Komarov who revealed after the war ‘that 
someone in our fleet at Hong Kong had been in his pay and that he had, through this 
person, obtained many original telegrams which dealt with the war in Manchuria’.41  
 
Fisher as Controller of the Navy had replaced the Army & Navy Cypher with the 
Boats Signal Book in 1895. While in the Mediterranean, he was apprised by the 
Foreign Office that traffic between London and Malta was being routed via French 
lines and immediately ordered a re-routing to avoid French interception. In 1901, he 
learned from a journalist of the sale of the Consular Cypher K by a vice-consul and 
pressed for its replacement by Cypher M. He pressed the Foreign Office for the 
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transfer of a consul in Crete reported to be on friendly terms with a Russian lady and 
subsequently arranged for the opening of the mail of the Russian consul at Valletta, 
who was found to have worked as a naval constructor and to be a potentially 
valuable observer of the Mediterranean Fleet. In view of the harassment of British 
consulates at Marseilles and Toulon and at Odessa and Sevastopol, manned by 
consuls with specialist knowledge of naval matters, Fisher devised an arrangement 
for these officials to leave their missions and travel to Barcelona or Bucharest to 
dispatch warnings of impending mobilization and war to Gibraltar and Malta in order 
to escape the interdiction of their messages by French and Russian secret police. 
The services of his informant at Syra were extended from the Admiralty to the War 
Office by Selborne via Lansdowne in late 1900 and intercepted Russian traffic there 
and at Aden was relayed to British and Indian Army agencies. Similar arrangements 
were put in place in South-East Asia and China through the initiative of the head of 
the China Force, General Creagh, in 1902. The fleet intelligence officer at Hong 
Kong, Captain Molloy, who was located on land in 1904 – like Gibraltar and Malta 
previously – visited Tokyo in late 1903 and exchanged information with a Japanese 
Navy liaison officer appointed to Hong Kong from 1902. Close contact was 
maintained with Army intelligence bureaux at Hong Kong and Tientsin and these 
officers in turn reported on contacts with British consuls in China and also passed on 
the results of these observations and of their own travels in Russian-controlled areas 
mainly via the British military attaché at Beijing. Secret liaison was also established 
with the Indian Army through the good offices of Sir William Nicholson (DGMI) after 
discussions with General Fukushima in London in July 1902 and liaison with General 
Kitchener resulted in the appointment of a Japanese Army liaison officer to the Indian 
Army Intelligence Bureau at Simla in November 1903.42 This was strengthened still 
further with the exchange of secret intelligence about Russia by Major Alfred 
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Wingate, a subsequent head of military intelligence at Simla, with Japanese Army 
secret agents in North China. Both the Japanese Army and Naval Staffs recruited 
British journalists and businessmen as agents in Asia and Europe, particularly in 
connection with the departure of the Baltic Fleet for the Far East in October 1904 
and these detailed contacts can be pursued in surviving Japanese archival 
sources.43 
 
Modernizing the NID 
Admiral Seymour had pointed out to Selborne in March 1901 that ‘it sometimes 
seems to me as if in England the action of Russia in the “Far East” is not 
appreciated’. Selborne had subsequently to warn Lord Brassey not to attribute 
information about France and Russia to the Admiralty: 
 
The numbers of the French Fleet are public property, but the Russian 
numbers reach us through more confidential sources. 44 
 
When Fisher joined Selborne at the Admiralty, however, his review of personnel 
pointed to the problems of the NID and generated the view, expressed by Selborne 
to his new DNI, Prince Louis of Battenberg, that too few officers served more than 
one tour of duty in the department and that it was desirable in future to bring back 
suitable officers for multiple tours. He also recommended that there should be an 
effort to increase the numbers of officers with foreign language fluency and drew a 
parallel with the special payments to Indian Army officers. Selborne indicated that he 
had already discussed these points with Custance, Battenberg’s predecessor as DNI 
from 1899 to 1902. Battenberg had served as Custance’s deputy between 1899 and 
1901 and he had been critical of Custance’s handling of fleet distribution and war 
planning because Custance had kept it in his head and committed none of it to paper, 
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something that made life difficult for a deputy especially if a crisis arose. Custance 
himself had subsequently admitted to Selborne that war planning was not a strong 
point of Admiralty organization but Battenberg had later – after he had fallen out with 
Fisher - argued that Custance had made substantial progress in making the NID 
more efficient.45 
 
When Custance moved from China to the Admiralty in 1899, nevertheless, one of the 
least satisfactory aspects of naval intelligence lay in the system of naval attachés. 
Only two naval attaché posts existed for the whole world and officers moved from 
capital to capital in Europe for a few weeks or months at a time, a major contrast with 
their military counterparts who had occupied residential posts in major centres since 
the 1860s and these included Tokyo from the time of the Sino-Japanese War. The 
situation for peripatetic naval attachés had become almost untenable by 1898 with 
the need to dispatch Captain Paget, then at St.Petersburg, to observe the situation in 
the Caribbean during the Spanish-American War. Further pressure came in the 
autumn with the outbreak of crises in China and the confrontation with France and 
Russia after Fashoda, which meant the need to keep attachés in Paris and 
St.Petersburg and avoid the unsatisfactory situation where military attachés were 
called by their heads of mission to double up for absent naval colleagues. The 
growth of the US Navy and the expansion of their steel mills and shipyards and the 
ongoing problems in the Far East were met by Custance with the appointment of a 
third naval attaché to cover America and Asia, Captain C.L. Ottley, who spent only a 
short time in Washington before moving to Tokyo for over a year.  
 
Ottley was an extremely conscientious observer who insisted on seeing formations 
and installations for himself, but found that he was hampered by the extreme 
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secretiveness of the Japanese naval authorities and by language difficulties, which 
could be overcome in part by permission to employ an interpreter. Few of Ottley’s 
personal papers appear to have survived, but it is clear that as a result of his hard 
work the confidential books on the Japanese Navy were all updated and Custance 
clearly understood from his observations that the Japanese fleet was in a virtual 
state of mobilization during the Boxer Uprising. 46  Minister Satow had strongly 
supported the extension of Ottley’s stay to a full year, but when he exchanged posts 
with Sir Claude MacDonald at the end of 1900, Ottley remained only a few more 
weeks before his transfer to St.Petersburg.47 Ottley’s stay in Russia was also a tour 
where he submitted detailed typed reports illustrated by photographs and provided 
highly reliable evidence based on his personal visits to yards on the Baltic and Black 
Seas, which provided a unique basis for a comparative estimate of the Japanese and 
Russian navies. Ottley was directly consulted by Selborne in the autumn of 1901 as 
part of the calculations essential for the naval budget when the Admiralty was under 
strong pressure from the Treasury to reduce costs in South Africa.48 
 
During his visit to the Black Sea in October 1901, Ottley met the Grand Duke 
Alexander Mikhailovich at Yalta and recorded his assessment that he did not think 
much of the capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet and cast doubt on the speedy 
achievement of a more modern force desired by the Grand Duke. Ottley pointed to 
the poor record of Russian shipyards, which could not complete battleship 
construction under five years, and the lack of available additional capacity in the near 
future. His intelligent analysis also paid dividends in terms of an accurate calculation 
of the personnel employed in the Russian Navy and of the real size of its budget, 
which, according to Sir Thomas Sanderson, had been ascertained by ‘a very 
ingenious process’. Through the purchase of information by the Embassy from 
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Secret Service funds and verified by consultations with the foreign naval attaché 
corps at St. Petersburg, it was learned that, following the announcement of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, an emergency meeting had been held under the 
chairmanship of the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich which decided to build an 
additional four battleships and two armoured cruisers as soon as possible and to 
increase the annual naval construction budget from £3.6 to £5 millions. As this meant 
the high likelihood of the Russians ordering warships abroad, the need to obtain the 
assistance of the consular service to monitor shipyards in Europe and America 
meant closer co-operation between the Admiralty and the Foreign Office.49 It was 
this surveillance which helped detect the chances of Japan purchasing the two 
Chilean and two Argentinian cruisers in Britain and Italy and simultaneously of 
preventing these being acquired by Russia and more adversely affecting the naval 
balance of power in the Far East on the eve of war. It is clear that the timing of the 
Japanese Navy’s opening attack on Port Arthur was largely determined by the timing 
of the safe delivery of the Argentinian ships with British crews under Japanese naval  
officers.50  
 
Initially, local co-ordination of policies in the Far East was a responsibility placed on 
the British Legation in Tokyo and on Admiral Bridge, the C-in-C in China. MacDonald 
had been apprised of the early stages of negotiation of the alliance while on leave in 
London, but no detailed information reached Bridge until after it was completed and 
correspondence between Selborne and Bridge on the subject does not figure before 
February 1902. Seymour, his predecessor, visited Fisher at Malta in early January 
1902 but no account of their exchanges appears to have survived, although Fisher 
was aware of Ottley's observations in 1900 and was in contact with Windham and 
Scott, ship commanders who had been transferred to China from the Mediterranean, 
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much to Fisher’s disgust. Fisher was probably better briefed than Bridge and was the 
one admiral who made a real effort to demonstrate active co-operation at his 
meetings with Admiral Ijûin at Malta in May 1902.51 Bridge claimed to admire the 
Japanese, but said he would rather have lived with any Caucasians, including the 
Russians, rather than the Japanese, if he had to make a choice. His visits to Japan 
in May and November 1902, April 1903 and April 1904 were sporadic because of the 
enormous geographical area of his responsibilities and both he and MacDonald 
strongly pressed for the appointment of a resident naval attaché in Japan. 
 
Captain Ernest Troubridge, currently the fifth naval attaché in Europe, was appointed 
to Tokyo but did not arrive until the end of May 1902. Bridge wanted to talk to 
Troubridge before he arrived and showed similar tendencies to impose his position 
on Troubridge’s successor, Captain Pakenham, on his way through Hong Kong in 
March 1904.52 Both certainly maintained a regular correspondence with Bridge and 
Noel, but their reports had to be relayed via the legation and the Foreign Office first 
and Captain Pakenham was under clear instructions from Battenberg that his first 
duty was to the NID, with the result that Captain Hutcheson was evidently sent to 
Japan in 1904 by Admiral Noel to represent the China Station staff. Troubridge was 
aware of the Japanese Navy’s preference for British benevolent neutrality and 
recommended to Battenberg that, if Britain became embroiled, a Japanese admiral 
ought to be the allied C-in-C.Bridge, however, kept thinking in terms of a joint war if 
at all, because his perception – like Balfour’s – was of Russian superiority on paper 
and this perception had been reinforced in August 1903 when he had visited Port 
Arthur and was treated to affable discussions with the Russian commanders. 
Selborne, Kerr and Battenberg, however, rejected Bridge’s perceptions and laid out 
their plans for the reinforcement of the China Station with battleships from the 
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Mediterranean and Battenberg’s scheme for a combined Eastern Fleet to be 
commanded by Noel in the event of any wider conflict. When reporting to Selborne 
the successful opening Japanese blows, Bridge claimed that these came as no 
surprise to him and his staff – a reaction not unlike that of the Kaiser to the Japanese 
Minister in Berlin after the victory at Tsushima in May 1905.53 
 
The scale of the Russian reinforcement by the Baltic Fleet equally posed a Russian 
superiority on paper which was complicated by the development of the Morocco 
Crisis in Europe and produced a sharp response from Fisher, now 1st Sea Lord, in 
wishing to side immediately with France and in trying to persuade Lansdowne and 
Balfour to sanction a pre-emptive strike on German bases. This course of action was 
rejected by Balfour, though the Kaiser complained to President Roosevelt of the 
British threat, and Captain Ottley, now DNI, pointed out to Fisher the delicate 
contradiction of his desire to support the French in Europe, but to punish them in the 
Far East for giving shelter in Indochinese waters to the Baltic Fleet, which proceeded 
to intercept and sink two British merchant ships in Chinese waters. Nevertheless, 
Fisher stuck by his strategic principle of concentration in Europe and actually 
ordered four battleships on the China Station to leave for home three weeks before 
the culminating clash, informing the Japanese side of this step only after the decisive 
victory at Tsushima. 
 
The overwhelming nature of this battle was what convinced the Russians of the need 
to seek peace. The British side had been strongly in favour of a negotiated peace 
since the Japanese capture of Port Arthur in January 1905 and had taken the step of 
recalling Spring-Rice from St.Petersburg and dispatching him to Washington to 
persuade President Roosevelt to step in as mediator. Roosevelt welcomed the move, 
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but found it exceedingly difficult to persuade both sides of the desirability of ending 
the conflict sooner rather than later and it was not until he received more formal 
approaches from both sides that the New Hampshire venue was proposed. It is 
difficult to discern any ulterior motive on the part of Fisher in withdrawing British 
battleships before the climax of the war, but table-top exercises in the Admiralty had 
undoubtedly pointed to Russian superiority.54 But what the war had demonstrated, 
among many other things, was the heavy Russian reliance on German logistic 
support for the transfer of the Baltic Fleet to the Far East and the tag placed by 
Balfour on German conduct: ‘the Germans are behaving abominably, and we must 
do what we can to prevent them squeezing any illegitimate advantage out of the 
situation they have endeavoured to create’.55 The perception of the Admiralty at this 
stage of the war between Russia and Japan amply reinforced the view in the War 
Office (since the Japanese victory at Mukden the previous month) that the time had 
come to revise its prescription of May 1903 for ‘the Secret Service in the Event of a 
European War’ in favour of a formula identifying Germany as the principal threat to 
British national security in the future.56 
 
Retrospect 
Although Selborne and Fisher trumpeted the Japanese accomplishment of the 
‘Trafalgar of the East’, the Japanese side was well aware that this accomplishment 
was by no means a wholly unalloyed cause for rejoicing in other capitals.57 Minister 
Takahira had secretly provided the US president with unpublished information about 
the scale of Japanese successes and reported on the wide scale of favourable 
response from the press and public opinion.58 President Roosevelt had certainly 
anticipated the possibility of victory swelling Japanese heads and subsequently 
privately observed to Spring-Rice: 
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I wish to see our navy constantly built up and each ship at the highest point 
of efficiency as a fighting unit. If we follow this course we shall have no 
trouble with the Japanese or any one else. But if we bluster; if we behave 
badly to other nations; if we show that we regard the Japanese as an inferior 
and alien race, and try to treat them as we have treated the Chinese; and if 
at the same time we fail to keep our navy at  the highest point of efficiency 
and size – then we shall invite disaster.59 
 
With the opening of the peace negotiations, the numerous press correspondents 
who had found Japanese censorship controls very irksome even by comparison with 
those imposed by the British Army in South Africa left the Far East en masse and 
Japan ceased to be an area of much significant interest to the media until the 
interwar era. The hostile public reaction in Japan to the news that no indemnity could 
be expected from Russia received little coverage, though it caused delays for ships 
of the China Squadron sent to participate in the victory review at Yokohama and 
President Roosevelt ‘was very much concerned lest my little Japanese friends, the 
statesmen over here, would have to kill themselves when they got back to Japan’.60  
It was inevitable, however, that the lucrative orders made in Britain by the Japanese 
Navy from the 1890s almost dried up after 1902 and the contacts which had been 
generated became increasingly platonic after the signature of the third 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance as signs of the pre-eminence of the Anglo-American 
relationship asserted themselves. Admiral Ottley, who had become secretary of the 
CID with Fisher’s support, wrote to Fisher on his 70th birthday and spoke of the most 
recent meeting of his Committee and of his discussion with prime minister Asquith: 
 
It has been a very interesting meeting, and a most valuable discussion was 
elicited regarding the renewal of the Anglo-Jap Alliance. 
I believe the happiest thing would be to bring about a tripartite agreement – 
Britain, America, Japan– and I believe that arrangement would be welcomed 
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with acclamation – if it could be worked.61 
 
The US Senate, of course, decided otherwise and a foretaste of these setbacks, 
which were much less satisfactorily settled at the Washington Conference in 1922, 
can be found in the history of the Russian treatment of neutral merchant ships during 
the war with Japan: not only did the German government refuse to adopt a common 
stance with Britain on the rules of belligerent search, but orders were issued by the 
US Solicitor-General that overtures from Britain to elicit a common stance on neutral 
and belligerent rights in war should be consciously evaded ‘inasmuch as whatever 
view might be expressed might become a source of embarrassment to the United 
States Government in the future’.62 Such points of common interest in relation to 
Russia began to develop into what were actually matters of common concern as a 
result of the increasingly arbitrary way in which US and British merchant ships came 
to be treated by Japanese naval units in the end phase of the war which involved 
absolute Japanese superiority at sea.63   
 
There were numerous incidents involving US-Japanese friction after 1898, most of 
which tended to be swept under the carpet, but indicated nevertheless that there 
were numerous groups in the USA which were hostile to or suspicious of Japanese 
policies and intentions. Japanese migration to Hawaii and California excited 
increasing alarm, for example, but in the Pacific there were concerns on the US side 
about Japanese interest in islands such as Midway, Guam and Wake and on the 
Japanese side about US claims in the Marcus Islands. However, perhaps the most 
troublesome issue lay in the Philippines where the US Army in particular regularly 
expressed anxieties about foreign support for the Filipino independence movement 
and its resistance to the US occupation after 1898. Sharp differences of opinion were 
already evident from early on in the case of German naval support for Spain and 
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German acquisition of the various island groups in the Central Pacific, but the US 
Army issued a report alleging covert Japanese support for the rebels in the form of 
arms supplies and citing captured rebel documents as evidence to sustain this.  
 
As British firms had formed the most significant element in the foreign trade of the 
Philippines, there were similar sorts of claim (akin to US allegations about trading 
with the enemy in Cuba, Vietnam and China in the second half of the 20th century). 
Units from the British China Squadron were seconded to the Philippines to protect 
British lives and interests after 1898 and every effort was made to reassure the US 
authorities to the contrary, but some British ship commanders, such as Hedworth 
Lambton, found the US naval command co-operative and affable but reported much 
less favourably about the army commanders and their methods of suppressing the 
rebellion. As covert US measures to assist the Filipino rebels prior to May 1898 had 
actually been significantly aided by British business interests at Hong Kong and 
Britain had acted as protecting power for the US during the war with Spain, any such 
complaints about Britain were bound to be discounted much more than those about 
Germany and Japan. The Admiralty had recognised that it was virtually inevitable 
that the USA would sweep Spain aside, even though reservations had privately been 
expressed about US conduct. In the South African War, where the roles of belligerent 
and neutral had been reversed, it is significant that, apart from Portugal, the only 
country whose consular cables were not subjected to censorship was the USA. 
Despite statements of support expressed both to Britain and Japan, Roosevelt’s 
comments on ‘fat-witted’ British diplomats in Washington and the on-going disputes 
over Venezuela and the operation of the joint naval surveillance in the Bering Sea, 
as well as the continuing secret reports from New York about Russian secret support 
for Fenian organizations there still left plenty of room for suspicions and doubts. But 
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there is no doubt that feelings of negativity in Anglo-American relations can be 
identified as developing on issues of major significance for the future, such as the 
rules of neutrality and belligerency, in the course of the Russo-Japanese War and 
that the continued existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance until 1922 provided a 
great deal of the fuel for this negativity. But it can be demonstrated that negative 
feelings diminished considerably at times when relations between Britain and Japan 
cooled or became fraught with differences of opinion, as over the issue of alleged 
Japanese support for the Indian independence movement and its links with Germany 
prior to the US entry into World War I. Anglo-American relations were and are still, 
nevertheless, even after 1922, subject to negative tendencies: but arguably the ideal 
envisaged by Ottley in 1911 has been a fact of international life since the end of 
World War II.  
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